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ABSTRACT
This article examines multiple problems now plaguing the fundamental
dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence between content-based and
content-neutral regulations of speech. The troubles were highlighted by the
U.S. Supreme Court's 2014 divided decision in McCullen v. Coakley.
Building from McCullen, this article uses a quartet of federal court rulings
from 2014 and 2013 involving anti-begging ordinances affecting the home-
less as analytical springboards for examining these issues in depth. Ulti-
mately, the article proposes a three-step framework for mitigating the mud-
dle and calls on the nation's high court to take action to clarify the proper
test for distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral regula-
tions.
INTRODUCTION
A time-tested, fundamental dichotomy in First Amendment1 jurispru-
dence involves distinguishing governmental regulations of protected
speech2 that are content based from those that are content neutral.3 This
distinction is important because content-based regulations of speech are
typically subjected to the heightened strict scrutiny standard of judicial re-
view,4 while content-neutral regulations are examined under a more re-
'The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free
Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and and local government entities and offi-
cials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666467 (1925).
2 Despite the First Amendment's absolutist language of Congress making "no law" abridging the free-
dom of speech, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified several categories of expression that receive no
First Amendment protection. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (listing, as un-
protected categories of speech, "advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action," ob-
scenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, fraud and
"speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent"); Brown
v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (identifying obscenity, incitement and fighting
words as categories of speech falling outside the ambit of First Amendment protection); United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468469 (2010) (identifying obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement and speech
integral to criminal conduct as types of speech not protected by the First Amendment); Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) (opining that "[t]he freedom of speech has its limits; it does
not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography
produced with real children").
3 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 758 (3d ed. 2006) (as-
serting that "[i]n countless First Amendment cases... the Court has invoked the content-based/content-
neutral distinction as the basis for its decisions").
4 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (asserting that because a California law limiting minors' access to vio-
lent video games "imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California
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laxed, intermediate scrutiny test.' The latter's leniency jibes squarely with
Professor Edward Eberle's observation that "commitment to the doctrine of
content neutrality is a pole star of First Amendment law."6 The former's
rigor, in turn, comports with Dean Erwin Chemerinsky's assertion that
"[n]o principle of free speech law is more basic than that the government
cannot regulate speech based on its content unless there is a compelling rea-
son to do so."'
In brief, as Professor Dan Kozlowski succinctly writes, the Supreme
Court "has devised tests to review content-based and content-neutral regula-
tions (strict scrutiny for content-based regulations, a more lenient interme-
diate scrutiny for those regulations deemed content neutral)."' In theory,
this bifurcated approach seems simple and tidy,9 but as Professor Leslie
Kendrick wrote in 2012, the Supreme Court's application of it is derided by
some scholars as "unprincipled, unpredictable and deeply incoherent."
Indeed, Justice Anthony Kennedy admitted some twenty years ago that
can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny - that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government
interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest"); United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S.
803, 813 (2000) (asserting that a content-based speech restriction can only stand judicial review "if it
satisfies strict scrutiny," opining that "[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be nar-
rowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest," and adding that "if a less restrictive alter-
native would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative"). In United
States v. Alvarez, a four-justice plurality, in issuing the judgment of the Court, did not use the term
"strict scrutiny" when referring to the standard applied to content-based laws, but instead labeled it "ex-
acting scrutiny." 132 S. Ct. at 2548.
5 See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (noting "that municipal ordinances
receive only intermediate scrutiny if they are content neutral"); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S.
180, 189 (1997) (asserting that "[a] content-neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amend-
ment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and
does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests," and labeling these
requirements as "the standards for intermediate scrutiny").
6 Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953,
972 (2004).
' Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG 413, 424
(2009).
8 Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Malleable Doc-
trine, 13 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 131, 131-32 (2008).
9 As Professor Leslie Kendrick recently encapsulated it in 2012, under this approach the Supreme Court
initially "performs a content analysis, which seeks to determine which laws are 'content based' and
which 'content neutral' - that is, which laws regulate speech because of its content and which do not.
After distinguishing content-based from content-neutral laws, the Court must give each its appropriate
level of review. This is the scrutiny analysis. Content-based laws receive strict scrutiny, which nearly
always proves fatal. Meanwhile, content-neutral laws receive what the Court calls "intermediate scruti-
ny," in practice a highly deferential form of review which virtually all laws pass. Leslie Kendrick, Con-
tent Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 237 (2012) (citations omitted).
1 Id. at 233.
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"[d]eciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neu-
tral is not always a simple task.""
Perhaps even more troubling, the Court's June 2014 opinion in the abor-
tion clinic case of McCullen v. Coakley demonstrates that the justices today
cannot even agree when a regulation is content based or content neutral. 12
In McCullen, five justices - Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Jus-
tices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena
Kagan - concluded that a Massachusetts statute1 3 affecting speech near re-
productive healthcare facilities in the Bay State was content neutral.1 4 In
stark contrast, a trio of justices - Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas - held that the statute "should be reviewed under the
strict-scrutiny standard applicable to content-based legislation." 5 Justice
Samuel Alito, in turn, went even further to find that the law was not simply
just content based, but also represented an instance of viewpoint-based dis-
crimination 6 - a sub-category of content-based regulations1 that is almost
always unconstitutional as "an egregious form of content discrimination." 8
This article analyzes the current confusion courts confront in determining
when a law is content based through the lens of four recent lower-court cas-
es affecting the speech rights of the homeless and others to beg for money
or food.19 Most notably, in September 2014, a three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit fractured two-to-one in Norton v.
City of Springfield.2' The judges split over whether an ordinance prohibit-
ing panhandling in Springfield, Illinois' downtown historic district was con-
" Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
12 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014).
'3 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120E1/2 (2014).
14 See MeCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2534 (holding that the "Act is content neutral" and finding that the "Act is
neither content nor viewpoint based and therefore need not be analyzed under strict scrutiny").
'5 Id. at 2548 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
16 See id. at 2549 (Alito, J., concurring) (opining that "[i]t is clear on the face of the Massachusetts law
that it discriminates based on viewpoint. Speech in favor of the clinic and its work by employees and
agents is permitted; speech criticizing the clinic and its work is a crime. This is blatant viewpoint dis-
criminationt").
'" See Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado,
the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need for an Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U. L.
REV. 179, 195 (2001) (calling viewpoint discrimination "a subset of content discrimination")..
IS Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); see Joseph Blocher,
Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REv. 695, 696 (2011) (observing that "[t]he
prevention of viewpoint discrimination has long been considered the central concern of the First
Amendment").
'" See infra Part II (examining recent lower-court rulings regarding panhandling).
20 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 714, 718,723 (7h Cir. 2014).
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tent based or content neutral. 21 The ordinance defined panhandling as "[a]ny
solicitation made in person upon any street, public way, public place, or
park in the city, in which a person requests an immediate donation of mon-
ey or other gratuity from another person. "22 It also made clear that begging
with a sign and without a vocal request was not panhandling.2 3
Writing for the two-judge majority in Norton, Judge Frank Easterbrook
concluded that Springfield's panhandling law was content neutral. 24 He
tellingly added, however, that "[w]e do not profess certainty about our con-
clusion.125  Nonetheless, applying the intermediate scrutiny standard for
time, place and manner regulations, Easterbrook found the ordinance was
constitutional.26
Dissenting, Judge Daniel Manion explained that he did "not join the
opinion of the court because the City of Springfield's panhandling ordi-
nance is a content-based regulation of speech, subject to strict scrutiny. By
concluding that the ordinance is content-neutral, the court misapplies the
Supreme Court's content-based regulation jurisprudence.12' The distinction
proved pivotal for Judge Manion, who found the law unconstitutional under
a strict scrutiny analysis because Springfield "has not alleged that the ordi-
nance's method of restricting speech is the least restrictive means to further
a compelling government interest. '28 In brief, the Seventh Circuit in Nor-
ton split over whether Springfield's statute was content based or content
neutral, and this disagreement, in turn, ultimately resulted in different views
about the statute's constitutionality.
This article demonstrates that much of the confusion in sorting out
whether laws that target begging are content based or content neutral stems
directly from a threshold problem. Specifically, lower courts cite and apply
very different standards and tests to determine whether panhandling statutes
are content based or content neutral. 29 The article illustrates that some of
the tests are convoluted and complex, while others are seemingly simple
and straightforward. It also argues that courts may be conflating considera-
21 Id. at 714, 717-18, 722-23; see also SPRINGFIELD, ILL., CODE § 131.06(e) (2014), available at https://
www.municode.com/library/il/springfield.
22 SPRINGFIELD, ILL. CODE § 131.06(a)(1) (2014), available at https://www.municode.com/library/il/spri
ngfield.
23 Id.
24 Norton, 768 F.3d at 717.
25 Id.
2 6 Id. at 717-18.
27 Id. at 718 (Manion, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 723 (Manion, J., dissenting).
29 Infra Part II.
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tion of the intent and purpose behind a law in this threshold determination
with whether the goals are compelling or significant after a standard of
scrutiny has been chosen. Without an agreed-upon test that is clear and
concise, confusion will continue to reign, leaving those who depend on
begging for a living left in the legal lurch.
Part I of this article initially provides a brief overview of begging as a
form of expression generally protected by the First Amendment.30 It then
reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncements, including in McCullen,
on how to distinguish content-based laws from those that are content neu-
tral.31 Next, Part II examines the different tests employed by courts in a
quartet of recent cases to decipher whether statutes and ordinances regulat-
ing begging are content based or content neutral.32 Part III then asserts that
courts might subtly be reluctant or hesitant to classify anti-begging laws as
content based because they recognize that the governmental interests under-
lying them simply cannot rise to the compelling level necessary to satisfy
strict scrutiny. 33 Finally, the article concludes in Part IV by arguing that un-
less a clear test - one that is straightforward in its application - is adopted
by all courts, the dichotomized First Amendment landscape that separates
content-based laws from content-neutral ones increasingly grows more
blurry and, in turn, less useful.34 Part IV proposes such a standard.
I. A PAIR OF PRIMERS: BEGGING AS SPEECH AND TESTS FOR CONTENT-
BASED REGULATIONS
This part has two sections, the first of which illustrates that begging is
now generally recognized by courts as a form of expression safeguarded by
the First Amendment. The second section then examines some of the Su-
preme Court's efforts, including most recently in McCullen v. Coakley,35 to
establish tests for parceling out content-based laws from content-neutral
ones.
0 Infra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
3' Infra notes 65-102 and accompanying text.
32 Infra notes 103-96 and accompanying text.
'3 Infra notes 197-226 and accompanying text.
3 Infra notes 227-48 and accompanying text
5 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
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A. Begging as Speech
A recent New Yorker magazine cartoon depicts two scruffy, disheveled
men standing on a sidewalk, their arms extended outward, holding baseball
caps as makeshift donation baskets while a man in a business suit strides
by.36 "Remember - we're not begging. We're crowdfunding," says one
beggar to the other.3 The humorous, modern-day vernacular certainly is
witty and amusing, but the efforts by municipalities around the nation to
crack down on begging are no laughing First Amendment matter.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether
begging constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes,38 courts today
widely agree that it falls within the ambit of that amendment. As the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit wrote in 2013, the Second, Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits have "held that begging is a type of solicitation pro-
tected by the First Amendment. We find these cases to be persuasive au-
thority, as well, for our holding that begging is a form of solicitation that
the First Amendment protects."3 9 The Fourth Circuit observed the same
year that "begging is communicative activity within the protection of the
First Amendment."4 The debate, in fact, is so well settled that in the 2014
case of Norton v. City of Springfield,41 the parties stipulated that "panhan-
dling is a form of speech, to which the First Amendment applies. 4 2
These decisions regarding begging and panhandling are founded upon
the more general premise, as one federal court put it in 2014, that
"[c]haritable solicitation by individuals is protected by the First Amend-
ment."43 Indeed, thirty-five years ago the U.S. Supreme Court in Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment held that it was "clear"
that "charitable solicitations in residential neighborhoods are within the pro-
tections of the First Amendment."'  The Court later extended that principle
36 David Sipress, Remember We're Not Begging, NEW YORKER, June 24, 2013, http://www.condenasts
tore.com/-sp/Remember-we-re-not-begging-We-re-crowdfunding-New-Yorker-Cartoon-
Prints i9651688 .htm.
37 Id.
38 See Julia Koestner, Comment, Begging the (First Amendment) Question: The Constitutionality of Ari-
zona's Prohibition of Begging in a Public Place, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1227, 1234 (2013) (noting that the
"Court has not explicitly extended constitutional protection to begging") (emphasis added).
31 Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 875 (6th Cir. 2013).
4 Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 553 (4th Cir. 2013).
4" Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2014).
42 Id. at 714.
43 ACLU of Idaho v. City of Boise, 998 F. Supp. 2d 908, 916 (D. Idaho 2014).
44 Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633 (1980).
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to solicitations within airport terminals.4 5 The Ninth Circuit recently reiter-
ated the solicitation-is-speech proposition, calling it "beyond dispute that
solicitation is a form of expression entitled to the same constitutional pro-
tections as traditional speech. 4 6 Courts now recognize that "charitable so-
licitation and begging are equivalent forms of speech for First Amendment
purposes."4
The judiciary, however, has not always viewed begging in this way. In
fact, just twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit wrote in Young v. New York City Transportation Authority that.common sense tells us that begging is much more 'conduct' than it is'speech"' and that "[w]hether with or without words, the object of begging
and panhandling is the transfer of money. Speech simply is not inherent to
the act."4 Ultimately, the Second Circuit concluded in Young that the only
message "common to all acts of begging is that beggars want to exact mon-
ey from those whom they accost. While we acknowledge that [subway]
passengers generally understand this generic message, we think it falls far
outside the scope of protected speech under the First Amendment."49 That
conclusion, although perhaps startling today, comports with the fact that
"[c]ourts historically enforced statutory proscriptions of begging without
challenge. 50 Thus, as one scholar asserts, "only within the past twenty-five
years have courts elucidated that begging constitutes speech within a First
Amendment framework. 51
To the extent that begging occurs on public sidewalks, it seems to merit
special protection because, "'time out of mind,' public streets and sidewalks
have been used for public assembly and debate, the hallmarks of a tradi-
tional public forum., 52  The U.S. Supreme Court recently reinforced this
principle in the Westboro Baptist Church case of Snyder v. Phelps.53 Chief
" See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674-75, 677, 679, 685 (1992)
(writing, in the context of a Port Authority of New York and New Jersey regulation forbidding the repet-
itive solicitation of money or distribution of literature within airport terminals, that "it is uncontested
that the solicitation at issue in this case is a form of speech protected under the First Amendment").
46 ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 2006).
4 New York v. Hoffstead, 905 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (N.Y. App. Term 2010).
48 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1990).
41 Id. at 154.
51 Charles Feeney Knapp, Comment, Statutory Restriction of Panhandling in Light of Young v. New
York City Transit: Are States Begging Out of First Amendment Proscriptions?, 76 IOWA L. REv. 405,
408 (1991).
51 Clay Calvert, Fringes of Free Expression: Testing the Meaning of "Speech " Amid Shifting Cultural
Mores & Changing Technologies, 22 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 545, 584 (2013).
52 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (quoting Hague v. Comm. Indus. Orgs., 307 U.S. 496,
515 (1939)).
51 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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Justice John Roberts wrote for the Snyder majority that "a public place ad-
jacent to a public street . . . occupies a 'special position in terms of First
Amendment protection."' 54 More recently, Chief Justice Roberts opined for
the McCullen majority that, "[c]onsistent with the traditionally open charac-
ter of public streets and sidewalks, we have held that the government's abil-
ity to restrict speech in such locations is 'very limited."' 5 5 Ultimately, then,
public sidewalks are "traditionally open to expressive activity. "56
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decisions involving regulations on
solicitation are in the context of venues not considered traditional public fo-
ra and not akin to public streets and sidewalks. They have, instead, dealt
with public fair grounds,5 airports58 and U.S. Post Office sidewalks.59
The criminalization of begging, of course, is highly controversial, given
both the individual-level and macro-level importance of such expression.
As Professor Nancy Millich asserted two decades ago, begging "should be
accorded the highest level of First Amendment protection. The beggars'
message, and indeed their very presence, contributes to the interchange of
ideas regarding homelessness. Their presence and activities also convey the
truthful information that American citizens are living as destitute, homeless
"60castaways. Certainly, beyond beggars' individual needs for sustenance,
"the presence of beggars makes it impossible for [people] to be oblivious to
the poverty in their midst.161  American Civil Liberties Union attorneys
Helen Hershkoff and Adam Cohen observe that "[b]egging is speech that
adds to both societal and individual enlightenment: it provides information
54 Id. at 1218 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)).
s McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (quoting Grace, 461 U.S. at 177).
56 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990).
57 Heffronv. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981) (calling it "clear that
there are significant differences between a street and the fairgrounds," pointing out that "[a] street is
continually open, often uncongested, and constitutes not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a
locality's citizens, but also a place where people may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and
neighbors in a relaxed environment," and adding, in the context of the Mvinnesota fair at issue, which
was "a temporary event attracting great numbers of visitors who come to the event for a short period to
see and experience the host of exhibits and attractions," that "any comparisons to public streets are nec-
essarily inexact").
58 See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (holding that airport
"terminals are nonpublic fora").
51 See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (concluding that "[t]he postal sidewalk at issue does not have the char-
acteristics of public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activity," and adding that "[the sidewalk
leading to the entry of the post office is not the traditional public forum sidewalk").
6' Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional
Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 255, 275 (1994).
61 Jonathan Mallamud, Begging and the First Amendment, 46 S.C. L. REv. 215, 217 (1995).
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about poverty and the lives of poor people. 62 Furthermore, attorney Farida
Ali passionately argues in a 2014 law journal article that:
[W]hile the sight of homeless persons begging or wandering the streets may be
unpleasant to some people, criminalizing the homeless for soliciting donations
or loitering fails to address the causes underlying such conduct in the first
place. indeed, communities would be better served by recognizing that the
presence of homeless persons offers a realistic measure of the city's economic,
social, institutional, and political disposition. 63
Similarly, attorney Daniel Mark Cohen adds that "expressions of begging
convey facts about the speaker's personal condition" and, in turn, "the very
purpose, and exalted value, of the exchange of social and political ideas is
for the prevention, alleviation, or reversal of individual human suffering,
the very purpose the beggar's speech serves. 64 Ultimately, it is clear that
begging constitutes speech and, in particular, a very important and contro-
versial variety of it.
B. Distinguishing Content-Based Laws from Content-Neutral Laws: A
Mixed Bag of Tests and a Cauldron of Confusion
This section explores some of the different approaches taken by the U.S.
Supreme Court for determining if a regulation is content based or content
neutral. As quickly becomes evident, a law that facially distinguishes be-
tween types of content can nonetheless, in some instances, be held content
neutral if the Court finds that it is supported by a legislative purpose or goal
that allegedly is unrelated to suppressing the message in question.
1.Does Enforcement Depend Upon What Is Being Said?
In penning the majority opinion in McCullen v. Coakley, Chief Justice
John Roberts began by noting that the first step of the analysis is a facial re-
view - to consider whether the law at issue "draw[s] content-based distinc-
tions on its face.1 65 He then articulated what seems, at first blush, to be a
62 Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to Beg,
104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 898 (1991).
6' Farida Ali, Limiting the Poor's Right to Public Space: Criminalizing Homelessness in California, 21
Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 197, 226 (2014).
64 Daniel Mark Cohen, Begging the Court's Pardon: Justice Denied for the Poorest of the Poor, 14 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 825,857 (2002).
65 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2523 (2014).
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clear, concise facial test for establishing if a law is content based - namely,
if it requires 'enforcement authorities' to 'examine the content of the mes-
sage that is conveyed to determine whether' a violation has occurred."66
Put more bluntly, do police or law enforcement officials need to listen to
what is being said - the content of the message - to decide if a crime has
occurred? This query, in fact, tracks the Chief Justice's citation in McCul-
len to his earlier opinion for the Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro-
ject.6' There, Roberts suggested that a regulation is content based if its ap-
plication "depends on what they say." 68
Under this rule, as applied by the majority in McCullen, it would seem
that any regulation singling out personal requests for immediate donations
of money or food from other forms of solicitation is content based. For in-
stance, in considering the constitutionality of a Boise, Idaho, ordinance that
prohibited "non-aggressive solicitations for donations of money or property
in other public areas, 69 U.S. District Judge Edward Lodge concluded in
2014 that the law was likely content based."v Judge Lodge reasoned:
The purpose of the ordinance is to suppress particular speech related to seeking
charitable donations and treats this speech content different than other solicita-
tion speech. The ordinance does not restrict solicitation of signatures for peti-
tion on a matter of public concern, political support solicitation, religious so-
licitation, etc. in the same public areas. It only restricts solicitation speech for
donations of money or property. 71
In other words, a police officer would need to listen to the content of a
query to determine if it violated the Boise ordinance. A request for some
items would be perfectly permissible, while a request for another item - an
immediate donation of money, specifically - is not. Similarly, in his dissent
in Norton, Judge Daniel Manion adopted a what-did-they-say approach in
holding that a Springfield, Illinois, anti-begging law was content based. 2
Manion observed that:
A police officer seeking to enforce the City's ordinance must listen to what the
speaker is saying in order to determine whether the speaker has violated the or-
dinance. Indeed, the officer must determine on which side of at least three dif-
ferent verbal distinctions the speech falls when evaluating whether the ordi-
nance has been violated .... The officer cannot answer any of these questions
66 Id. (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984)).
67 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
68 Id. at 27.
69 ACLU of Idaho, Inc. v. City of Boise, 998 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (D. Idaho 2014)
71 Id. at 916.
7' id.
72 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2014) (Manion, J. dissenting).
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without listening to and understanding what the speaker is saying. That is pre-
cisely the sort of situation that the Supreme Court said involves a content-based
regulation. 71
In summary, one seemingly easy way to suss out a content-based law
simply is to ask whether its application depends upon or entails an examina-
tion by law enforcement authorities of what is being communicated. Do, in
other words, the meaning of the words make a difference? Unfortunately,
this unadorned approach does not always end the judicial analysis, as the
next sections illustrate?
2. Is the Regulation Concerned with the Direct Impact of the Message
on Its Audience and Listeners?
Returning to the high court's 2014 decision in McCullen, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts added for the majority that an otherwise facially content-
neutral statute is not, in fact, so "if it were concerned with undesirable ef-
fects that arise from 'the direct impact of speech on its audience' or
'[listeners' reactions to speech.' '74 Putting this test to practice as applied
to Massachusetts' buffer-zone law, Roberts explained that "if, for example,
the speech outside Massachusetts abortion clinics caused offense or made
listeners uncomfortable, such offense or discomfort would not give the
Commonwealth a content-neutral justification to restrict the speech."17 5 In
other words, these reasons, which relate to the negative impact of speech on
its audience, would make the restrictions content based.
The emphasized portion of Roberts' statement above is critical when it
comes to anti-begging laws. These laws are, at bottom, concerned about
shielding passersby from potential negative reactions - offense, discomfort,
fear, duress - they might experience when asked for money. Such direct-
impact audience reactions to the speech, in turn, may result in a so-called
secondary effect 76 - namely, a downstream negative economic effect in a
municipality if people are deterred from shopping or working in an area be-
cause they allegedly experience distress or discomfit when verbally con-
fronted by beggars.
71 Id. at 721.
74 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531-32 (2014) (quoting Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988)).
75 Id. at 2532 (emphasis added).
76 See infra Part I.B.4 (addressing the secondary effects doctrine).
77 See Patricia K. Smith, The Economics of Anti-Begging Regulations, 64 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 549, 552
(2005) ("Beggars become most worrisome to merchants and neighborhood residents if their presence
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Yet, it is the direct impact on the audience that triggers this secondary ef-
fect, thus rendering nugatory a secondary effects argument to try to make
the regulation content neutral. The secondary effect here thus might be re-
ferred to as a pass-through secondary effect, since it only occurs once the
message passes through the reaction of its audience.
Offense and discomfort with speech that occurs in public venues like the
sidewalks and street corners where begging often transpires are not suffi-
cient reasons to abridge First Amendment speech rights. In Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, the Court upheld the right to convey the offensive, clothing-based
message "Fuck the Draft"8 in a public courthouse. In doing so, the Court
noted the reduced expectations of privacy in public places"9 and emphasized
that "presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatical-
ly to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense."8  The remedy
for people offended in public places is to avert their eyes81 or, in the case of
beggars' spoken requests, to simply walk on by.
Indeed, in protecting the right to burn the American flag as a form of
symbolic speech, Justice William Brennan wrote for the Court in Texas v.
Johnson that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amend-
ment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. 82
The Court, fourteen years before Johnson, found in Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville that "[m]uch that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our
political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not
permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are
sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or
viewer. "83
Similarly, if a municipality asserts that the direct impact on the audience
of speech by beggars is fear, that too would not be sufficient to justify cen-
impedes the local economy. Retail shop owners often complain that beggars deter potential customers.
• . Concern over the negative monetary consequences of begging may be especially important when the
local economy depends heavily on tourism").
78 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
71 See id. at 21-22 ("[W]hile it may be that one has a more substantial claim to a recognizable privacy
interest when walking through a courthouse corridor than, for example, strolling through Central Park,
surely it is nothing like the interest in being free from unwanted expression in the confines of one's own
home.").
s0Id. at 21.
sI See id. ("Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.").
82 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
8 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975).
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sorship, unless the speech actually amounted to a true threat of violence. 4
True threats constitute one of the very categories of speech not protected by
the First Amendment. 5 In general, however, fear by itself is not sufficient
to restrict speech. As Justice Louis Brandeis famously observed more than
eighty-five years ago, "[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppres-
sion of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears."8 6
In summary, it seems that under either of the first two approaches ad-
dressed above - namely, whether enforcement of a regulation depends on
listening to what is being said and whether a regulation is concerned with
the direct impact and reaction of the message on its audience - statutes that
single out begging for money or food are content based. But as the next
sub-section makes clear, there is yet another method the Supreme Court has
embraced to sort out content-based laws from content-neutral ones.
3.Was the Regulation Adopted Because the Government Disagrees with
the Message Being Censored?
The quest for distinguishing content-based laws from content-neutral
ones becomes muddled when courts go searching for legislative intent
and purpose. In determining whether a sound-amplification ordinance
affecting a bandshell in New York City's Central Park was content based
or content neutral, the Supreme Court in Ward v. Rock Against Racism
wrote that "[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in
speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of dis-
agreement with the message it conveys."8 Writing the opinion of the
Court, the then-recently appointed Justice Anthony Kennedy added that
84 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (defining true threats as "statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
to a particular individual or group of individuals," and adding that "[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death").
85 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2102) (identifying true threats as one of the few
categories of speech not protected by the First Amendment and citing the Court's decision in Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), to support that proposition); see generally Eugene Volokh, One-To-
One Speech vs. One-To-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and "'Cyberstalking", 107 Nw. U. L.
REV. 731, 751 (2013) (observing that "speech about people can be punished when it constitutes a 'tre
threat' of criminal attack").
86 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
87491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). (emphasis added).
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"[t]he government's purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation
that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neu-
tral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others."88
Under this tack, then, the legislative purpose and intent behind a regula-
tion affecting speech is key: if the purpose is unrelated to a disagreement
with the content of the message, then the regulation is content neutral. Jus-
tice Kennedy reiterated and reinforced this purpose-based approach in 2011
in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., quoting favorably language from Ward.89 In
Sorrell, which addressed the constitutionality of a Vermont law restricting
"the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that reveal the prescrib-
ing practices of individual doctors,"9 Kennedy added that even if a "meas-
ure on its face appeared neutral as to content and speaker, its purpose to
suppress speech and its unjustified burdens on expression would render it
unconstitutional. "91
Yet, in concluding that the law at issue in Sorrell was content based,
Kennedy focused on the fact that "[b] oth on its face and in its practical
operation, Vermont's law imposes a burden based on the content of speech
and the identity of the speaker. '92 He added that the law "is directed at cer-
tain content and is aimed at particular speakers." 93 In other words, Kennedy
seemed to be concerned more with the terms of the law ("on its face") and
in its "practical operation" when analyzing it rather than with its purpose.
In fact, Justice Kennedy clearly suggested in 2002 that there is no need
for examining legislative intent because "whether a statute is content neutral
or content based is something that can be determined on the face of it; if the
statute describes speech by content then it is content based." 94 In other
words, in accord with Chief Justice Roberts' observation in McCullen,95 the
first step - which seemingly can also be the last step - is to examine the
face of the law, not its legislative purpose.
88Id.
89 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011).
9 Id. at 2659.
9' Id. at 2664.
92 See id. at 2665, 2667 (concluding that the statute "imposes a speaker- and content-based burden on
protected expression, and that circumstance is sufficient to justify application of heightened scrutiny")
(emphasis added).
93 Id.
94 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (asserting that "to begin, the Act does not draw
content-based distinctions on its face").
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Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts suggested in McCullen that legislative in-
tent is only considered when a facially neutral law allegedly "dispropor-
tionately affect[s] speech on certain topics. '9 6 He explained that "[t]he
question in such a case is whether the law is 'justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech."' 9
Nonetheless, a purpose-based approach to the content-based/content-
neutral issue has led legislative bodies to suggest so-called content-neutral
objectives under the secondary effects doctrine. That doctrine is described
in the next sub-section.
4.The Secondary Effects Doctrine
Further complicating the process of identifying content-based and con-
tent-neutral laws is the secondary effects doctrine. As Professor John Fee
explains it, this doctrine "provides that a regulation will be treated as con-
tent-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny, despite its content-
discriminatory form, if the primary purpose of the regulation is to control
the secondary effects rather than the primary effects of speech."9 8 The doc-
trine typically applies when municipalities or states attempt to zone sexual-
ly oriented businesses (SOBs).9 9 First Amendment defense attorney Herald
Price Fahringer notes that secondary effects typically include things "such
as a rise in crime or a decline in property values, rather than a perceived un-
pleasantness of having adult videostores or topless bars in a given neigh-
borhood.""1  Indeed, Professor Daniel Linz and his colleagues point out
that these "effects have most often included alleged increases in crime, de-
creases in property values, and other indicators of neighborhood deteriora-
tion in the area surrounding the adult business. Typically, communities
have either conducted their own investigations of potential secondary ef-
fects or have relied on studies conducted by other cities or localities. " 10 1
96 Id.
9' Id. (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
98 John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 292 (2009).
99 See Clay Calvert & Robert Richards, The Free Speech Coalition & Adult Entertainment: An Inside
View of the Adult Entertainment Industry, Its Leading Advocate & the First Amendment, 22 CARDozo
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 247, 277 (2004) (noting that "municipalities rely on a doctrine called secondary ef-
fects to support" ordinances targeting sexually oriented businesses).
l.. Herald Price Fahringer, Zoning Out Free Expression: An Analysis of New York City's Adult Zoning
Resolution, 46 BUFFALO L. REV. 403, 413 (1998).
'.' Bryant Paul et al., Government Regulation of 'Adult" Businesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity
Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 355, 356
(2001).
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The secondary effects doctrine really amounts, as Professor George
Smith II and Gregory Bailey assert, to an "exception to the strict scrutiny
test" because "[c]ritical analysis demonstrates that zoning ordinances target-
ing SOBs cannot qualify as content-neutral. 10 2 In fact, as another com-
mentator notes, the "secondary effects test evolved because the Court rec-
ognized that zoning ordinances targeted solely at adult businesses (rather
than all businesses) were content based regulations."1 3 As such, Professor
Ashutosh Bhagwat labels the secondary effects doctrine "an extremely odd
one, as it seems clearly inconsistent with the Court's approach to content
neutrality elsewhere in its First Amendment jurisprudence, and though it
has been cited elsewhere, the Court has actually relied upon it only in the
context of sexually oriented speech." 0 4 The real problem, Bhagwat points
out, is that lower courts have taken the secondary effects doctrine and "ex-
tended [it] beyond the arena of regulations of sexually oriented businesses
to which the Supreme Court has confined it, into other areas of First
Amendment analysis - with predictably troubling results." '"5
Furthermore, Professor Lynn Mills Eckert criticizes the secondary effects
for confusing "the question of whether a law is content-based with whether
localities have a sufficient purpose for regulation." ' 6 She also points out
that many supposed secondary effects "are not so secondary. Such a cri-
tique focuses on the impact of the pornographic speech rather than the ef-
fects of the regulation. Increases in prostitution or increases in sexual har-
assment are directly related to the pornographic message." '°
Joining in the chorus of criticism is David Hudson, a scholar with the
First Amendment Center, who bluntly asserts that the "doctrine continues to
wreak havoc in First Amendment jurisprudence" by allowing "government
officials to claim that patently content-discriminatory regulations - often
those that restrict only businesses featuring adult-oriented expression - are
treated as content-neutral.""1 8 In fact, as Professor Seth Kreimer put it after
102 George P. Smith II & Gregory P. Bailey, Regulating Morality Through the Common Law and Exclu-
sionary Zoning, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 403,437-38 (2011).
03 Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint Neutral Zoning of Adult Entertainment Businesses, 31
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447,459 (2004).
'" Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Juris-
prudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 783, 797 (2007).
105 Id. at 804.
116 Lynn Mills Eckert, The Incoherence of the Zoning Approach to Regulating Pornography: The Exclu-
sion of Gender and a Call for Category Refinement in Free Speech Doctrine, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
863,878 (2003).
10 Id. at 879.
"' David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary-Effects Doctrine: Stripping Away First Amendment Freedoms,
23 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 19, 19-20 (2012).
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conducting a thorough analysis of multiple opinions, several justices on the
nation's high court even consider the secondary effects doctrine to be "a bit
of a cheat."1"9
The controversial and contested doctrine was first hatched by the Su-
preme Court nearly forty years ago in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc."' There, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Detroit zoning
ordinance that distinguished between movie theaters that exhibit sexually
explicit adult movies and those that do not."' The Court wrote that De-
troit's "determination was that a concentration of 'adult' movie theaters
causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects which
are not attributable to theaters showing other types of films. It is this sec-
ondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dis-
semination of 'offensive' speech."' 1 2
Ten years later, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the high
court expressly clarified that "zoning ordinances designed to combat the
undesirable secondary effects of such businesses are to be reviewed under
the standards applicable to 'content-neutral' time, place, and manner regula-
tions."1 3 The Court, in an apparent attempt to distinguish what might be
considered primary effects from secondary effects, wrote that the interests
underlying Renton, Washington's SOB zoning law were "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression" a1 4 and were "not to suppress the expression
of unpopular views. '""' Instead, the interests were, among other things, "to
prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, [and] maintain property val-
ues. "116
In 2002, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor reiterated Renton's secondary ef-
fects principle in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, writing that "the
Renton ordinance was aimed not at the content of the films shown at adult
theaters, but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surround-
ing community, namely at crime rates, property values, and the quality of
... Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality, 16 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1261, 1297 (2014).
"0 427 U.S. 50 (1976); see Britt Cramer, Zoning Adult Businesses: Evaluating the Secondary Effects
Doctrine, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 577, 587 (2014) (identifying Young as the case in which "[t]he secondary
effects doctrine was first introduced").
...Id. at 52.
112 Id. at 71 n.34 (emphasis added).
113 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986).
14 Id. at48.
15 Id.
116 id.
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the city's neighborhoods. Therefore, the ordinance was deemed content
neutral." 17
In a critical concurring opinion in Alameda Books," 8 Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote that primary effects, in contrast to secondary effects, are re-
lated to the impact of speech on its audience, such as when messages"change minds" and "prompt actions." 1 9 He added that "a city may not at-
tack secondary effects indirectly by attacking speech. 1 2  This language
goes a long way toward explaining why laws that target begging in the
name of helping businesses thrive are content-based laws and should be
subjected to strict scrutiny review. In particular, begging "prompts actions"
by people who might not want to shop in an area where beggars are present.
It is this direct impact of the speech, as it "change[s] minds" on its audience
about where to conduct business, that harms a municipality's economy.
Furthermore, Kennedy frankly admitted that categorizing zoning laws
that target SOBs as content-neutral regulations is a legal fiction and that,
instead, "[t]hese ordinances are content based and we should call them
so. ' '12' Despite this confession, he carved out an intermediate scrutiny ex-
ception for such zoning measures, writing that "a zoning restriction that is
designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. "122
Ultimately, secondary effects is a contested doctrine that the Supreme
Court has confined to the zoning of sexually oriented businesses. The
Court has never applied it to anti-begging statutes.
"' City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002).
.. See Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny
and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL'Y 349, 360 (2011) (Kennedy's concurrence in Ala-
meda Books has been identified as "the controlling concurrence" in the case).
".. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (As Kennedy opined, secondary effects
are "unrelated to the impact of the speech on its audience." By implication, then, primary effects must be
related to the impact of the speech on its audience (emphasis added)).
120 Id. at 450.
121 Id. at 448.
122 Id. at 448, 449 (As Kennedy put it, "the government has no power to restrict speech based on content,
but there are exceptions to the rule" and that "zoning regulations do not automatically raise the specter
of impermissible content discrimination, even if they are content based, because they have a prima facie
legitimate purpose: to limit the negative externalities of land use.").
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5. The Close Call Scenario
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, Justice Stephen Breyer au-
thored a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor. 23 In it, Breyer opined that where "a
statute applies criminal penalties and at least arguably does so on the basis
of content-based distinctions, I should think we would scrutinize the statute
and justifications 'strictly' - to determine whether the prohibition is justi-
fied by a 'compelling' need that cannot be 'less restrictively' accommodat-
ed."124 The emphasized language is pivotal because it suggests that in a
close-call scenario - one in which it is not definitively clear if a law is con-
tent based or content neutral - courts should err on the free speech side by
calling it content based and require the government prove its constitution-
ality under strict scrutiny.
In summary, the Court has provided multiple ways for distinguishing
content-based laws from content-neutral ones. It also has carved out an
exception from strict scrutiny analysis regulations zoning SOBs under
the legal fiction known as the secondary effects doctrine. The next part
illustrates how some lower courts are now grappling with the content-
based-versus-content-neutral issue in the context of local ordinances
that restrict individuals who request an immediate donation of money or
food.
II. FERRETING OUT CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS: DIVERGENT
APPROACHES BREED DIVERGENT DECISIONS ON THE RIGHT TO BEG IN
PUBLIC PLACES
When an Arizona appellate court in 2011 considered the constitu-
tionality of a Phoenix ordinance banning panhandlers from orally asking
passersby for cash after dark, it astutely observed that "in determining
whether the amended ordinance violates the First Amendment, logically we
first would consider whether the distinctions drawn by the ordinance dis-
criminate based on the content of speech. The authorities that guide that de-
termination, however, are not altogether consistent."25 In light of such
recognized judicial inconsistency, the court ultimately punted on making a
decision. It reasoned, instead, that "[w]e need not try to reconcile these
precedents .. .because even if we assume the prohibition added to the
123 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
' 24 Id. at 45.
125 State v. Boehler, 262 P.3d 637, 641 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added).
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Phoenix ordinance in 2003 is content-neutral, it cannot survive constitu-
tional scrutiny."'1 26 In other words, regardless of which standard - strict or
intermediate scrutiny - the court would apply, the regulation would not pass
constitutional muster.
Although judicial dodges like this on the content-based-versus-content-
neutral issue may be acceptable when a statute cannot satisfy either level of
scrutiny, they certainly are not preferable and, in turn, are not possible when
the level of scrutiny would, indeed, make a key difference in deciding a
statute's fate. With this in mind, this part analyzes four recent federal court
decisions - three at the appellate court level, one at the trial court level - af-
fecting the right to beg and the various tests deployed therein to ferret out
content-based laws from content-neutral ones. The decisions are addressed
in reverse chronological order, starting with the most recent 12' and proceed-
ing to the oldest. They were selected for analysis due to their recency and
because they illustrate divergent tacks (and disparate results) in addressing
the content-based issue.
A. Norton v. City of Springfield
In September 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
considered the constitutionality of a Springfield, Illinois law banning,
in its downtown historic district, panhandling.1 28  The measure defines
panhandling as an "as an oral request for an immediate donation of mon-
ey" and exempts from its strictures both written signs requesting money and
oral requests for money to be donated at a later date. 129 The ordinance was
challenged by Don Norton and Karen Otterson, both of whom regularly
panhandle in the area.130 They alleged to having "been arrested numerous
times even though they don't verbally request money" but instead hold
signs.131
126 Id. at 643.
27 A more recent decision regarding panhandling was issued after this article was written. In Reynolds v.
Middleton, the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Henrico
County. No. 13-2389, 2015 WL 756884, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 2015). The appellate court found that
the ordinance prohibiting the act of soliciting while "standing" in medians was not narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest. Id. at *8.
128 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2014).
129 Id.
130 Deana Stoisch, Cahnman Defends City's Panhandling Ordinance, STATE JOURNAL-REGISTRAR
(Sep. 7, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.sj-r.com/article/20130907/News/309079955.
131 Id.
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As noted earlier, the appellate court split two-to-one on whether this
amounted to a content-neutral law and, in turn, whether it was constitution-
al.132 Judge Frank Easterbrook, in penning the majority opinion upholding
the law, observed the threshold problem at the center of this article - name-
ly, that "[o]ther courts of appeals have divided on the question whether
rules similar to Springfield's are content-based." '133
Judge Easterbrook also referenced a key problem that plagues ordinances
that attempt to narrow their scope by applying only to particular subsets of
begging (oral, for instance, rather than written) instead of applying more
broadly to all forms of solicitation. In particular, he wrote that the "rule
that regulation of speech must be narrowly tailored ... becomes an engine
of destruction, because every effort to narrow a rule will distinguish some
speech from other speech and so, in plaintiffs' view, doom it.1134 Put dif-
ferently, a Catch-22 occurs for legislative bodies because an attempt to nar-
row a content-neutral statute's reach may transform it into a content-based
law and thus subject it to a more rigorous - in particular, strict scrutiny -
standard of judicial review.
Judge Easterbrook's test for determining if the Springfield ordinance
should be subjected to strict scrutiny can only be described as convoluted
and cumbersome when compared to the tests described in Part I, Section B
of this article. Specifically, Judge Easterbrook initially suggested that not
all content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, reasoning here
that "the 'content-based' restrictions that require special justification are a
subset of those that depend on the subject-matter of the speech. 135 In other
words, for Judge Easterbrook, there is an essential dichotomy between"subject-matter (usually allowed) and content-based (usually forbidden)
distinctions" '136 in First Amendment jurisprudence.
In terms of the latter, usually forbidden category, the judge opined there
are actually two types of content-based regulations for which such special
justifications (apparently, meaning a compelling interest per strict scrutiny)
must be found - one "that restricts speech because of the ideas it conveys"
and one "that restricts speech because the government disapproves of its
message. 13
132 Norton, 768 F.3d 713.
'33 Id. at 714.
134 Id. at 715.
135 Id. at 717.
136 Id.
13" Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
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Did Springfield's ordinance fall into either of these two suspect catego-
ries of content-based regulations? Judge Easterbrook said the answer was
no, asserting "[i]t is hard to see an anti-panhandling ordinance as entailing
either kind of discrimination."138 At this point, Judge Easterbrook went into
an analysis that seemingly suggests that begging for money, in and of itself,
lacks the kind of value that merits a strict scrutiny analysis. "'Give me
money right now' does not express an idea or message about politics, the
arts, or any other topic on which the government may seek to throttle ex-
pression in order to protect itself or a favored set of speakers," he wrote.139
Yet, in fact, the government may seek to squelch such requests to pater-
nalistically protect others, even if not itself, from messages with which they
disapprove.140 Indeed, the government often seemingly disapproves of beg-
gars' messages because requests for money may deter people from shop-
ping in particular areas of town.14 1 That those messages do not relate to art
or politics does not make them inherently less worthy of First Amendment
protection.
Judge Easterbrook also found it important that enforcement of Spring-
field's ordinance is indifferent as to "the pitch used"' 14 2 when asking for
money. In other words, an individual's stated reason behind a request for
an immediate donation of money makes no difference, with a request "be-
cause I'm homeless" being treated in the same fashion under the ordinance
as a request "because my daughter is sick" or "because the distribution of
income is inequitable." '143 Because the "why," as it were, was treated indif-
ferently by Springfield, its statute was content neutral.
Judge Easterbrook even added a dose of First Amendment theory to his
analysis. He opined that "Springfield has not meddled with the marketplace
of ideas" because "what activates the prohibition is where a person says
something (in the 'downtown historic district') rather than what position a
person takes on a political or literary question." 1" The marketplace of ideas
theory, of course, was imported into First Amendment jurisprudence nearly
100 years ago in Abrams v. United States.14 5 That is when Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously reasoned in a dissenting opinion that:
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See Smith, supra note 77, at 551-52.
'4' Smith, supra note 77, at 552.
142 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 717 (7' Cir. 2014).
143 Id.
144id.
145 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment.14 6
Holmes' economic metaphor for a free trade in ideas today is known as
the marketplace of ideas, and it is linked squarely with much of modern free
speech theory in the United States. 147 Two of the core tenets of the market-
place theory, as Harvard's Derek Bambauer observes, are that government"regulation is unnecessary, and undesirable" and that "governmental limits
on communication are inherently suspect because they restrict the flow of
competitive products into the marketplace and undercut valuable self-
expression." 48
Dissenting in Norton, Judge Daniel Manion bluntly rejected the notion
that the marketplace of ideas provides a test for determining if a law is con-
tent based.149  Instead, he turned directly to the Supreme Court's 2014
McCullen decision for guidance. 5  Manion wrote that McCullen "reminds
us that a regulation is content-based if it draws 'content-based distinctions
on its face,"' such that enforcement authorities must examine the content of
a message to decide if a violation has occurred.1 51
To operationalize this test in Norton, Manion asserted that one "must
temporarily step into the shoes of the City's enforcement authorities. A po-
lice officer seeking to enforce the City's ordinance must listen to what the
speaker is saying in order to determine whether the speaker has violated the
ordinance.1 52 Specifically, an officer would need to listen to hear if the
speech was:
-"a request for money (a violation) or "a request for the listener's time, signa-
ture, or labor (not a violation);"
146 Id.
'4 See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 823-25 (2008) (ob-
serving that Justice Holmes' passage in Abrams "conceptualized the purpose of free speech so powerful-
ly that he revolutionized not just First Amendment doctrine, but popular and academic understandings of
free speech," and that "[n]ever before or since has a Justice conceived a metaphor that has done so much
to change the way that cours, lawyers, and the public understand an entire area of constitutional law").
148 Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the
Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 653 (2006).
141 See Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 722 (7h Cir. 2014) (Manion, J., dissenting) (writing
that, "[i]n its attempt to determine whether the ordinance is content-based, the court examines whether
the ordinance strips a viewpoint from the marketplace of ideas. That is not the test for determining
whether an ordinance is a content-based regulation of speech").
'5 0 Id. at 721.
'5' Id. (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014)).
152 Id.
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-"a request for an immediate transfer of money (potentially a violation) or
merely a request for the transfer of money at a future date (not a violation)";
and
-"a request for a charitable donation (potentially a violation) or merely a re-
quest for a commercial transaction (not a violation)." '153
Judge Manion thus concluded that because an "officer must listen to and
understand the speech to determine if the ordinance has been violated
means that the ordinance is content-based, unlike those laws which can be
imposed based merely on the volume, location, or conduct accompanying
the speech." '154 In turn, as a content-based law, Springfield's ordinance was
subject to strict scrutiny, with Judge Manion noting that "the City all but
concedes that it cannot satisfy this demanding standard." 155 Manion thus
called for an injunction stopping its enforcement. 156
In summary, the majority and dissent took two very different approaches
for resolving the question of content-neutrality and reached two very differ-
ent results. Judge Manion followed McCullen's straightforward does-it-
make-a-difference-what-is-said approach. He did not need to delve into the
legislative intent to make his decision. In contrast, Judge Easterbrook
adopted a multi-layered approach that: 1) drew distinctions between sub-
ject-matter and content-based distinctions; 2) identified two types of con-
tent-based distinctions that might be subject to strict scrutiny; and 3) ulti-
mately resorted to - or, more charitably put, turned to - the marketplace of
ideas theory of free expression for support. Unfortunately, as of the writing
of this article, Norton is the only post-McCullen case to address a begging
ordinance, thus leaving it unclear if other lower courts will embrace Judge
Manion's use of the McCullen majority's approach in similar cases.
B. Thayer v. City of Worcester 151
In June 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered
the constitutionality of two ordinances adopted by Worcester, Massachu-
setts, one of which focused on so-called "aggressive" panhandling and the
other which addressed panhandling on roadways, intersections and traffic
islands. 15  The appellate court, in an opinion authored by former U.S. Su-
153 Id.
154 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 722 (7h Cir. 2014).
155 Id. at 723.
156 Id.
151 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014).
151 See Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 64-65 (1 st Cir. 2014) (describing the ordinances).
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preme Court Associate Justice David Souter, reasoned that "[i]n determin-
ing whether a particular regulation is content-neutral, the principal enquiry
is 'whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.'"159 In other words, the key test
cuts directly to the legislative purpose of the regulation, not to the face of
the statute. He added that the entire aim or point underlying the rule sub-
jecting content-based laws to strict scrutiny "is to bar the government from
suppressing speech because it disapproves the message. 16 Thus, message
disapproval is determinative.
Perhaps critically, Thayer was decided on June 19, 2014,161 just one
week before the Supreme Court issued its McCullen ruling. As noted earli-
er, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the McCullen majority that the statute at
issue there was content neutral because "the Act does not draw content-
based distinctions on its face" and that it "would be content based if it re-
quired 'enforcement authorities' to 'examine the content of the message that
is conveyed to determine whether' a violation has occurred.1 62 In other
words, the first step of the analysis after McCullen seems to be to examine
the face of the statute and to ask, as Judge Manion did in Norton, if en-
forcement authorities must listen to the message being conveyed to decide
if it is content based or content neutral. Writing Thayer before McCullen
was decided, however, Justice Souter did not have the benefit of this in-
sight. Whether his analysis might have changed had McCullen come down
first thus is speculative.
Worcester's aggressive panhandling ordinance makes it "unlawful for
any person to beg, panhandle or solicit any other person in an aggressive
manner." 163 Soliciting, in turn, is defined as "using the spoken, written, or
printed word, bodily gestures, signs, or other means of communication with
the purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of money or other thing of
value. 1 64 Aggressiveness encompasses both violent and threatening lan-
guage, as well as location-based prohibitions such as soliciting a person
within twenty feet of an automated teller machine or a sidewalk cafd.16 5 In
' Id. at 67 (emphasis added) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
161Id. at 68.
161 Id. at 60.
162 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2523 (2014).
163 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2014).
164Id.
161 Id. (Aggressiveness is defined "at two levels. The definition included obviously threatening behavior,
as by soliciting someone "in a manner.., likely to cause a reasonable person to fear immediate bodily
harm," using "violent or threatening language," or blocking a person's right of way. It further covered a
range of potentially coercive though not conventionally aggressive behaviors, including soliciting from
someone waiting in line to buy tickets or enter a building; soliciting after dark, calculated as "the time
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other words, geographically defined buffer zones consisting of supposed
danger areas are used, in part, to define aggressiveness.
The First Circuit concluded this statute was content neutral after, as Jus-
tice Souter wrote, examining both the face of the law and the legislative in-
tent behind it.166 What seemed crucial for the appellate court was the stat-
ute's focus on aggressive panhandling, not all panhandling in general. As
Souter wrote:
the text of the ordinances does not identify or affect speech except by reference
to the behavior, time or location of its delivery, identifying circumstances that
raise a risk to safety or that compromise the volition of a person addressed to
avoid solicitation: it is aggressive, particularly obtrusive or alarming or risky
solicitation, that is forbidden.16 7
It was also important for the appellate court that the law applied equally
to all solicitors, regardless of the subject matter. "Girl Scout cookie sellers
and Salvation Army bell-ringers are as much subject to the Aggressive Pan-
handling Ordinance as the homeless panhandler," Souter observed.168
Souter acknowledged that the ban applied only "to solicitations for 'im-
mediate' donations of money," but found that this limitation did not render
the statute "content-based as First Amendment doctrine employs the
term."'69 This last portion of italicized content is key because it acknowl-
edges that "content based" is a legal term of art rather than a phrase to be
taken literally. It suggests a regulation may, indeed, literally be content
based, but may not be so as the term is deployed in First Amendment juris-
prudence.
Thus, assuming arguendo "that the ban on immediate donations is a con-
tent distinction," Justice Souter nonetheless wrote that such a "distinction
alone does not render the ordinance content-based so long as it reflects a le-
gitimate, non-censorial government interest."1'  He reasoned that "[e]ven a
statute that restricts only some expressive messages and not others may be
considered content-neutral when the distinctions it draws are justified by a
legitimate, non-censorial motive."1 ' 1 In other words, the government's al-
from one-half hour before sunset to one-half hour after sunrise"; continuing to solicit from a person after
the receipt of a negative response; and soliciting anyone within 20 feet of an entrance or parking area of
a bank, automated teller machine, public transportation stop, pay phone, theater, or any outdoor com-
mercial seating area like a sidewalk cafe.").
.../Id. at 67.
' 6' Id. at 67-68.
168 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir. 2014).
169 Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
170 Id.
1'1 Id. at 68.
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leged purpose, motive and intent are key, not whether or not the law singles
out some types of expression from others.
In October 2014, the plaintiffs in Thayer filed a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. 172 A key part of their petition argu-
ment is that "the Court should vacate the decision below and remand for the
First Circuit to reconsider its decision in light of McCullen. 1 7 ' The petition
specifically cites McCullen's does-it-matter-what-is-being-said approach
described in Part I, Section B, Subsection 1 of this article. 1 4 The petition
then emphasizes that this test "contains no subjective intent requirement
and is directly at odds with the First Circuit's approach below."1
C. ACLU of Idaho v. City of Boise
In January 2014, U.S. District Judge Edward J. Lodge considered the
constitutionality of a Boise, Idaho, statute prohibiting solicitation of money
in certain public places. 1 6 The statute defined solicitation as:
to request, ask, or beg, whether by words, bodily gestures, signs, or other
means, for an immediate donation of money or other thing of value, including
the purchase of an item or service for an amount far exceeding its value, under
circumstances where a reasonable person would understand that the purchase is
a donation. 177
Although the government argued the ordinance was content neutral,
Judge Lodge ruled otherwise and concluded the plaintiffs were "likely
to succeed on the merits of their claim that the ordinance is not content neu-
tral" and that the City of Boise "has not carried its burden in establishing
the ordinance is content neutral."1 7s To reach this result, Judge Lodge ap-
plied a disjunctive test under which a law is content based "if either the un-
derlying purpose of the regulation is to suppress particular ideas or if the
regulation, by its very terms, singles out particular content for differential
172 Thayer, 755 F.3d60,petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 13 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2014) (No. 14-428).
173 Id. at 4.
174 Id. at 29.
175 Id. at 29-30.
176 ACLU of Idaho v. Boise, 998 F. Supp. 2d 908 (D. Idaho 2014). Specifically, solicitation is banned,
among other places, in "an open public area while a person is waiting in line to be admitted to a com-
mercial establishment, while on Boise's public transportation systems, in open public areas within twen-
ty (20) feet of an ATM or entrance to a banking establishment, sidewalk caf6, mobile or street vendor,
any entrance or exit from a public toilet facility (including temporary port-a-potties), any bus stop, taxi
stand or valet drop off/pickup station or stand, any parking pay box or station." Id. at 915.
177 Id.
171 Id. at 916-17.
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treatment."1 ' This is an interesting approach because the first part ("the
underlying purpose") entails examination of legislative intent, while the
second part ("by its very terms") requires no such examination of legislative
intent and, instead, focuses on the face of the statute. The disjunctive "or"
means that a judge has the power to find a law content based due either to
its legislative intent or to its terms.
Apparently applying the second, facial part of this test in City of Boise,
Judge Lodge reasoned that the ordinance suppresses:
particular speech related to seeking charitable donations and treats this speech
content different than other solicitation speech. The ordinance does not restrict
solicitation of signatures for petition on a matter of public concern, political
support solicitation, religious solicitation, etc. in the same public areas. It only
restricts solicitation speech for donations of money or property. 180
In terms of comparing this analysis with the logic embraced by Judge
Manion's dissent in Norton,"' it means that a law enforcement officer in
Boise would need to listen to the nature of the solicitation to determine
what it was for and, in turn, to determine if a violation of the Boise law oc-
curred. Judge Lodge, perhaps hedging his judicial bet against a possible
appeal that might later classify the ordinance as content neutral, added that
even if the Boise law was content neutral, Boise still could not satisfy in-
termediate scrutiny. 1 2 Focusing on Boise's interest in adopting the statute,
Lodge drew a pivotal distinction between aggressive and non-aggressive
panhandling, with only the latter at issue in the case.8 3 He reasoned that"while the aggressive solicitation prohibition is clearly related to public
safety, the restrictions on non-aggressive solicitation do not appear to raise
the same public safety governmental interest. Business owners and resi-
dents simply not liking panhandlers in acknowledged public areas does not
rise to a significant governmental interest." ' 4 He also found that the means
of carrying out this alleged interest were not sufficiently tailored, writing
that "[w]hile the ordinance does leave open the ability to sit or stand pas-
sively in a very limited public area with a sign requesting money or proper-
.Idat 916 (quoting Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 2013)) (emphasis add-
ed).
I"o ACLU of Idaho v. Boise, 998 F. Supp. 2d 908, 916 (D. Idaho 2014).
181 See supra Part II.A.
'82 ACLU of Idaho, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
183 See id. (noting that "Plaintiffs are not challenging the aggressive solicitation portion of the ordi-
nance").
184 Id.
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ty, this is not an ample alternative channel for communication of the infor-
mation. " ' 5
D. Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville
In February 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered the constitutionality of a Charlottesville, Virginia, ordinance prohib-
iting solicitations for immediate donations of money or other things of val-
ue near two streets running through the city's Downtown Mall.186 The
ordinance was challenged by several financially strapped local men who
claimed to rely, in part, on begging to sustain themselves and who asserted
the ordinance was a "content-based regulation that criminalizes speech
based on the content of the communication."'18 7
Initially, the Fourth Circuit found that "the speech and expressive con-
duct that comprise begging merit First Amendment protection" and, in turn,
that the Downtown Mall where begging was regulated constitutes a "quin-
tessential public forum over which the First Amendment's shield is strong-
est."' 88 In brief, First Amendment rights were fully at stake.
The court then turned to the issue of whether the ordinance was content
based or content neutral. 89 In doing so, it applied what it called "a prag-
matic rather than formalistic approach to evaluating content neutrality."1 90
It explained that:
not every content distinction merits strict scrutiny; instead, a distinction is only
content-based if it distinguishes content "with a censorial intent to value some
forms of speech over others to distort public debate, to restrict expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or to prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreea-
ble. 1 91
Under this approach, a content-based law is only subject to strict
scrutiny if any one of three criteria - each of which requires an exami-
nation of legislative intent - exists. The Fourth Circuit readily found
185 Id.
186 Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 551-52 (4th Cir. 2013).
Is? Id. at 552.
188 Id. at 553, 555.
'8 9 Id. at 555-560.
'0Id. at 556.
'9' Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 556 (quoting Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 301-02 (4th Cir. 2013)
(internal citations and alterations omitted)).
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that the Charlottesville ordinance was, indeed, content-based on its
face, reasoning that it:
plainly distinguishes between types of solicitations on its face. Whether the
Ordinance is violated turns solely on the nature or content of the solicitor's
speech: it prohibits solicitations that request immediate donations of things of
value, while allowing other types of solicitations, such as those that request fu-
ture donations, or those that request things which may have no "value" - a sig-
nature or a kind word, perhaps.1 9 2
While such facial distinctions seemingly would have been sufficient
for both Judge Manion in Norton and Judge Lodge in City of Boise to
apply strict scrutiny to the Charlottesville ordinance, the Fourth Circuit
delved further. "[W]e do not end our inquiry there," it wrote, turning then
to the legislative purpose behind the law under its so-called "pragmatic ap-
proach."'1 93 Here, however, the Fourth Circuit found itself flummoxed and
unable to reach a conclusion, dubbing itself "ill-equipped to reach a conclu-
sion as to censorial purpose, based on the record before us, at this junc-
ture. 194
Specifically, at the motion to dismiss stage and considering only the
pleadings before it, the Fourth Circuit observed that Charlottesville's ordi-
nance included no official statement of purpose and "no evidence is proper-
ly before us to indicate the City's reason or reasons for enacting the ordi-
nance." 195 In contrast, the plaintiffs had alleged in their complaint that
Charlottesville adopted the ordinance specifically "to prevent their unde-
sired presence on the Mall" and to stop them "from conveying their un-
wanted message.1 96 This was sufficient for the Fourth Circuit to conclude
that the district court had erred in dismissing the complaint, and it remanded
the case back to the lower court. 197
In summary, the Seventh Circuit's split decision in Norton, Justice
Souter's ruling for the First Circuit in Thayer, Judge Lodge's opinion in
City of Boise and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Clatterbuck demon-
strate a range of different approaches and divergent results in cases in-
volving anti-begging regulations and the larger question of whether
they are to be treated as content based or content neutral. The next part
192 Id. at 556.
193 Id.
194Id. at 556.
195 Id. at 558.
196 Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 559460.
19' Id. at 560.
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suggests there could be a latent and lurking reason why some judges are
reticent to find such laws content based.
III. THE NEAR IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEGGING BANS SATISFYING STRICT
SCRUTINY, AND JUDICIAL OPTIONS FOR ANALYZING SUCH
REGULATIONS
One possible reason for some courts categorizing begging bans as
content-neutral restrictions on expression may be judicial recognition
that labeling them content based almost assuredly dooms them to fail-
ure. Strict scrutiny, as Justice Stephen Breyer recently wrote, subjects a
speech regulation to "near-automatic condemnation"19 8 and constitutes "a
categorization that almost always proves fatal to the law in question." '199
Furthermore, Justice Antonin Scalia remarked in 2011 for the majori-
ty in the violent videogame case of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association that strict scrutiny "is a demanding standard. °2 0 0 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concurred with this sentiment in
October 2014, remarking that strict scrutiny "is exceedingly difficult,
and the vast majority of such regulations are held to unconstitutionally in-
hibit speech.1 201  After the high court's ruling in United States v. Alvarez,
the standard became even more rigorous because the government now must
prove there is "a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the
injury to be prevented.2 0 2
In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the
U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an anti-
solicitation ordinance.2 3 In doing so, it recognized that prevention of
"undue annoyance" and fraud allegedly caused by solicitors are "sub-
stantial" interests. 2 14 Similarly and much more recently, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed, when considering a facial over-
' United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
... Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 366 (2009).
200 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
201 Showtime Entm't, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 71 (1st Cir. 2014).
202 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549.
... 444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980) (writing that the ordinance in question prohibited "the solicitation of con-
tributions by charitable organizations that do not use at least 75 percent of their receipts for 'charitable
purposes,' those purposes being defined to exclude solicitation expenses, salaries, overhead, and other
administrative expenses").
'04 Id. at 636.
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breadth challenge to a Michigan statute criminalizing begging, that
"prevention of fraud and duress are substantial state interests.
Although a substantial interest may be sufficient to sustain a content-
neutral regulation evaluated under intermediate scrutiny, it does not rise
to the level of a compelling interest or an interest of the highest order
necessary to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard of review.20 6 Further-
more, the Court in Schaumburg found that a municipality's "legitimate
interest in preventing fraud can be better served by measures less intrusive
than a direct prohibition on solicitation. '2 1 In other words, such a ban
adopted in the interest of targeting fraud simply is not narrowly tailored and
thus would fail strict scrutiny. As the Sixth Circuit recently suggested, the
governmental "interest in preventing fraud can be better served by a statute
that, instead of directly prohibiting begging, is more narrowly tailored to the
specific conduct, such as fraud. '2 8 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2012
in United States v. Alvarez listed fraud as one of the few categories of
speech not protected by the First Amendment.2 9 In other words, the reme-
dy is to target fraud specifically, not begging generally in hopes of sweep-
ing up fraud in a vast purse seine net.
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist wrote that "face-to-face solicitation presents
risks of duress that are an appropriate target of regulation. The skillful, and
unprincipled, solicitor can target the most vulnerable, including those ac-
companying children or those suffering physical impairment and who can-
not easily avoid the solicitation. 210 Yet to ban all begging because of the
possibility that a few beggars might engage in duress-inducing speech di-
rected at some individuals surely is, as the U.S. Supreme Court once put it,
"to bum the house to roast the pig."211  Put more bluntly, it is legislative
overkill and extreme overbreadth.
205 Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2013).
206 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); see also Brownv. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131
S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (observing that under strict scrutiny, a regulation must be "justified by a com-
pelling government interest"); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979, 982 (1994)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (equating a compelling interest to "a 'paramount' interest, an interest 'of the
highest order"'); Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict
Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL'Y 349, 358 (2011) (observing that a "signifi-
cant or important interest is lesser than a compelling interest under strict scrutiny").
207 Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637.
208 Speet, 726 F.3d at 880.
209 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012).
210 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 684 (1992).
211 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); see generally Clay Calvert, Of Burning Houses and
Roasting Pigs: Why Butler v. Michigan Remains a Key Free Speech Victory More than a Half-Century
20151
282 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVIII:iii
Furthermore, to the extent that begging occurs in public places like side-
walks, any discomfort experienced comes, literally, with the territory. As
Chief Justice Roberts wrote in McCullen:
With respect to other means of communication, an individual confronted with
an uncomfortable message can always turn the page, change the channel, or
leave the Web site. Not so on public streets and sidewalks. There, a listener
often encounters speech he might otherwise tune out. In light of the First
Amendment's purpose "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail," this aspect of traditional public fora is a
virtue, not a vice. 2
12
Such public policy concerns, grounded in a venerated First Amendment
theory like the marketplace of ideas,213 militate in favor of the imposition of
strict scrutiny when begging transpires on public sidewalks.
What, then, should the Court do? One option the Court can adopt when
it comes to evaluating regulations that negatively affect begging for imme-
diate donations of money or food in public places (but allow other types of
solicitation) is simply to do what Justice Kennedy did in Alameda Books
when it comes to the zoning of sexually oriented business.2 14 Namely,
openly admit that the regulations are content based, yet carve out an excep-
tion for them from the general rule of strict scrutiny and, instead, apply the
more relaxed intermediate scrutiny standard, provided the government
proves the regulations are aimed at so-called secondary effects of begging.
This path forward avoids the somewhat dubious, if not disingenuous, judi-
cial efforts to reason that regulations that, per McCullen, require law en-
forcement personnel to listen to the content of speech to determine if a vio-
lation occurs are nonetheless content neutral.
In other words, the Court could treat both sexually oriented businesses
and the homeless who beg as, to borrow Kathleen Sullivan's fine phrase,
"second-class First Amendment citizens 21 5 and, in turn, give the govern-
ment a judicial break when regulating them. As Sullivan, former dean of
the Stanford Law School and currently named partner and chair of the na-
tional appellate practice at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, puts it,
Later, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 247 (2012) (addressing this principle and the lasting importance of the case
in which the U.S. Supreme Court articulated it).
212 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (emphasis added) (quoting FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)).
211 See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FiREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (describing the mar-
ketplace of ideas as "perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech tradition," and noting that
its premise is that "humankind's search for trth is best advanced by a free trade in ideas").
214 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
215 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203, 206 (1994).
CONTENT-BASED CONFUSION AND PANHANDLING
"the government nearly always wins" 216 when a regulation is treated as if it
were content neutral.
Two immediate problems arise with such a categorical carve-out ap-
proach from the general rule of strict scrutiny. First and foremost, although
the Supreme Court now treats corporations and humans - in this instance,
SOBs and beggars - as if they are one in the same when it comes to First
Amendment rights, it also holds that "the Government may commit a con-
stitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. 2 1
As Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority in Citizens United v. Federal
Elections Commission:
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the Government
deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to
establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice. The Government
may not by these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to deter-
mine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration. The First
Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each. 218
Treating SOBs and beggars as somehow less deserving of full First
Amendment rights by making it easier for the government to regulate
their speech directly violates this logic of speaker equality. Why, in
other words, should these speakers be singled out from the otherwise
established rule that content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny?
The answer to that query may be found in the second problem with
this approach. In particular, the Court increasingly seems to be moving
away from a methodology that distinguishes between high value and
low value expression originally instantiated in First Amendment juris-
prudence by the fighting words case of Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire.219 As Professor Ronald Collins recently wrote, the Roberts Court
216 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, at 208, http://www.quinneman
uel.com/attorneys/sullivan-kathleen-m.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
217 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (reasoning that the First Amendment prohibits
"restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others," and
finding that "[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to
control content"); see also Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing
Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2 (2010)
(observing that the Court in Citizens United held that "corporations are equal to human beings, at least
under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause").
218 558 U.S. 310, 340-41 (2010).
219 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the Court wrote in dictum that "it is well understood
that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have nev-
er been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
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"has generally declined to expressly invoke Chaplinsky's low-value
speech prong as a rationale for enlarging the realm of unprotected ex-
pression. '220 Furthermore, the Court made it clear in Brown v. Enter-
tainment Merchants Association that the border separating political
speech from entertainment fare is too blurry to draw clear doctrinal
lines. 21 Violent video games therefore receive the full amount of First
Amendment protection and regulations that target them in the name of
protecting minors from alleged harm must be subjected to strict scruti-
ny.222 It thus seems jurisprudentially jarring to hold that laws targeting
violent video games produced by corporations for entertainment pur-
poses are subjected to strict scrutiny, while laws negatively affecting
humans' ability to beg for life-sustaining food or money are only meas-
ured against intermediate scrutiny.
A second option is for the Court to admit that regulations that nega-
tively affect begging for immediate donations of money or food in public
places (but allow other types of solicitation) are content-based measures and
subject them to strict scrutiny. In other words, unlike option one, the Court
would not carve out an exception for them and, instead, would demand that
the government demonstrate the existence of a compelling interest that can-
not be served by an alternative regulation that restricts less speech.
As noted above, this standard would be very difficult to prove. 223 For
example, to the extent the regulations are designed to prevent fraud, laws
targeting fraud are more narrowly tailored to address that issue than are
laws targeting begging.224 Furthermore, to the extent that the laws are de-
signed to protect businesses that might lose potential foot-traffic customers
who don't want to come into contact with beggars, it would seem like a dif-
ficult argument to make that a businesses' ability to make more money
should trump and take precedence over a homeless person's right to ask for
money in order to eat.
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morali-
ty." Id.
220 Ronald K. L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom The Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New
Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REv. 409, 424 (2012).
221 See 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (writing that while "[t]he Free Speech Clause exists principally to
protect discourse on public matters ... we have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics
from entertainment, and dangerous to try").
222 See id. at 2738 (observing that "video games qualify for First Amendment protection").
223 See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text
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Importantly, after Brown and Alvarez, municipalities would also need to
prove a direct causal link - not simply a correlation225 - between the speech
of beggars and the negative effects such speech allegedly causes for which"ambiguous proof will not suffice. '226  This means that municipalities
would need to conduct their own studies or offer some form of evidence re-
garding begging in their communities and its alleged deleterious effects be-
fore adopting regulations. Those studies would need to be conducted with
sufficient rigor to prove a direct causal link between begging and its alleged
harms. Furthermore, as Justice Scalia suggested in Brown, the real-world
size of those effects would need to be considered. 22' All of this would seem
very difficult for a municipality to demonstrate, further illustrating why
strict scrutiny would be a very high hurdle for anti-begging regulations to
clear.
IV. CONCLUSION
Begging ordinances are not likely to go away any time soon in the
United States. As Professor Alafair Burke of Hofstra University recently
observed, "in the name of community, cities have enacted or increased the
enforcement of substantive criminal laws that are focused more on social
compliance than traditional criminal punishment, such as prohibitions
against public camping, panhandling, and loitering. "228 A study of 188 mu-
nicipalities conducted by the National Law Center on Homelessness and
Poverty found there was "a seven percent increase in prohibitions on beg-
ging or panhandling between 2009 and 2011 .229 The trend is not limited to
a particular part of the country. For example, Sarasota, Florida, adopted an
anti-begging ordinance in 2013,230 East Hartford, Connecticut approved one
in June, 2014231 and lawmakers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania were consider-
ing a begging ordinance in late 2014.232
225 See JOANN KEYTON, COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: ASKING QUESTIONS, FINDING ANSWERS 231 (3d
ed. 2011) (observing that "correlation does not necessarily equal causation," and pointing out that "[t]he
strength and direction of the correlation coefficient do not speak to the likelihood that one variable
caused the other variable to increase or decrease in the way that it did").226 Brownv. Entm'tMerchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011).
227 See id. (deriding California's studies as demonstrating only "minuscule real-world effects," and la-
beling those effects as "both small and indistinguishable from effects" caused by other sources).
228 Alafair Burke, Policing, Protestors, and Discretion, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1011 (2013).
229 Dan Frosch, Homeless are Fighting Back Against Panhandling Bans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2012, at
A12.
230 Jessie Van Berkel, Sarasota OKs a New Ban on Panhandling, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Apr. 24,
2013, http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20130423/ARTICLE/130429855?p= 1&tc-pg.
231 Hilda Munoz, Anti-Panhandling Ordinance Approved; Measure Modeled After Others in State, Pro-
hibits Aggressive Behavior, HARTFORD COURANT, June 4, 2014, http://articles.courant.com/2014-06-
20151
286 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVIII:iii
Furthermore, the implications of the content-based-versus-content-
neutral issue addressed in this article extend beyond the realm of begging
into other statutes targeting different forms of solicitation. For example, in
2011 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit fractured, in an en
banc ruling, over whether an ordinance targeting solicitation by day labor-
ers for employment was content based or content neutral. 233 The ordinance
made it unlawful to "stand on a street or highway and solicit, or attempt to
solicit, employment, business, or contributions from an occupant of any ve-
hicle."234
The majority applied the intermediate scrutiny test for time, place and
manner regulations.235 In contrast, a concurring opinion expressed the view
that the ordinance "is a content-based, rather than content-neutral, re-
striction on speech. It restricts discussion of certain subject matters-
namely, speech that requests employment, business, and contributions -
while allowing free discussion about other subject matters. 236
Dissenting, Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski even argued the
statute targeted only conduct and not speech.23 Assuming, arguendo, that
speech was involved, Kozinski would have characterized the law as content
neutral, reasoning that it "draws no distinctions based on content; it doesn't
favor one kind of speaker over another. What it does is to regulate a very
narrow and finely drawn class of conduct: standing around on sidewalks
and street comers in order to interact with passing motorists. 23  Unfortu-
nately, the U.S. Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to hear the case
and resolve the issue. 9
The problem is that the variety of tests described in Part I, Section B for
distinguishing content-based laws from content-neutral ones provide courts
with an array of options and choices that can lead to very different conclu-
03/community/hc-east-hartford-panhandle-0604-20140603 1 your-town-news-new-ordinance-veterans-
affairs-commission.
232 Steve Hallock, Panhandling in Pittsburgh: Bruce Kraus' Proposed Ordinance Would Be Unconstitu-
tional, PITTSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Oct. 20, 2014, http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-
Ed/2014/10/20/Panhandling-in-Pittsburgh-Bruce-Kraus-proposed-ordinance-would-be-
unconstitutional/stories/201410200025.
233 Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1566 (2012).
2 34 Id. at 941.
235 See id. at 945.
236 Id. at 954 (Smith, J., concurring).
237 Id. at 958-59 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
238 Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d at 958-59 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
239 City of Redondo Beach v. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 132 S. Ct. 1566 (2012), denying
cert. to 657 F.3d 936.
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sions regarding the same statute. Should courts consider only the face of a
statute and ask if law enforcement officers must listen to what is being said
to know if it has been violated? Should courts go beyond this facial ap-
proach and delve more deeply into the legislative purpose or purposes that
gave rise to a statute? And should they consider if those interests are relat-
ed to the direct impact of the speech on those who hear it - the primary ef-
fects of speech rather than the supposed secondary ones?
The Court has several possible routes it can adopt to clarify this muddle.
The most concise and effective of these options, in the author's opinion and
in terms of erring on the First Amendment side of maximizing free speech,
involves three uncomplicated steps:
1. Initially, courts would adopt the straight-forward approach embraced
most recently by the McCullen majority. They would simply ask whether
or not a law enforcement officer must listen to what is being said - listen to
the substantive content of the words being spoken - in order to determine if
a violation has occurred.24 ° If, on the face of the statute, it would make a
difference what is being said - if, for example, it makes a difference wheth-
er someone is asking for money/food or, instead, whether they are asking
someone to sign a petition, to join in a rally or get a ride to work - then the
law is content based and subject to strict scrutiny.
There simply is no need to go into an examination of legislative intent at
the threshold stage of deciding if a law is content based or content neutral if
it is content based on its face. As Justice Kennedy wrote in 2002, "whether
a statute is content neutral or content based is something that can be deter-
mined on the face of it; if the statute describes speech by content then it is
content based. '24 1 If, in turn, the legislative interest underlying a law is
strong enough - if it is compelling - then it will be able to support a con-
tent-based law under a strict scrutiny analysis.242
2. If it is unclear after consideration of the first step whether a law is
content based or content neutral, then courts should adopt Justice Breyer's
suggestion that close cases should be decided under strict scrutiny rather
than intermediate scrutiny.243 In other words, the benefit of the doubt
should go to the First Amendment interests, not to those of the government.
240 Supra Part I.B.1.
241 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
242 See supra text accompanying note 4 (describing the strict scrutiny standard of review).
243 Supra Part LB.5.
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3. Finally, only if a law is found facially content neutral under the first
step should the individual or group challenging it be able to argue, per
McCullen, that it nonetheless is content based because the legislative body
that adopted it was "concerned with undesirable effects that arise from 'the
direct impact of speech on its audience' or '[1]isteners' reactions to
speech."2' In other words, an ordinance that bans all forms of solicitation
- regardless of topic or request and not confined only to begging - in a spe-
cific geographic area of a municipality would nonetheless be held content
based if government was concerned about the audience's negative reaction
to solicitation. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Alameda Books, the primary
effects of speech are those related to the impact of the speech on its audi-
ence, such as changing minds and prompting people to act, and they "signi-
fy the power and the necessity of free speech."245
Under this step governmental concerns that individuals who are solicited
by beggars might be put in a state of discomfort, offense, fear or duress are
primary effects of speech and make a regulation content based. Why? Be-
cause they represent the listeners' reactions to the speech. They may
prompt people to walk away quickly or to never visit an area of town again.
This three-step analysis scraps the secondary effects doctrine and, unless
step three is necessary, spares courts from having to ferret out the legisla-
tive purpose of a law. Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat observed back in 1997
what he called the Court's "renewed interest in the previously forbidden ter-
rain of purpose scrutiny, including a new willingness to examine, and pass
independent judgment on, the reasons why the state has chosen to burden
individual rights."246 He contended then that "there is an inconsistent but
recurring tendency in the Court's content jurisprudence to define content-
neutral laws as those 'justified without reference to the content of the regu-
lated speech' - in other words, the question of whether a law is content-
neutral or not depends on the purpose of the challenged law.''24 Bhagwat
asserted that this approach contributes to "extraordinary doctrinal confusion
over the most basic questions underlying the Court's content jurisprudence"
and that "at least part of that confusion is related to the Court's failure to
develop an adequate framework to engage in purpose scrutiny." '24 8 He ulti-
244 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531-32 (2014) (quoting Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988)).245 Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
246 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 312 (1997)
(emphasis added).
247 Id. at 316 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (emphasis added).
2 4 81 d. at 316-17.
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mately called for the Court to abolish the distinction between content-based
and content-neutral laws.249
Rather than completely jettison this dichotomy to the ash can of First
Amendment jurisprudence's discarded doctrines, the three-step approach set
forth above preserves it while mitigating the muddling that comes in the
quest for legislative purposes. Ultimately, and particularly after its frac-
tured 2014 ruling on the issue in McCullen, the high court must clarify the
test that lower courts should use in deciding whether a law is content based.
The quartet of anti-begging cases examined in this article bring both the
importance and timeliness of this problem into high relief.
249 Id. at 362.
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